In
February 2024 the High Court in London handed down a decision to remove an
arbitrator in a film industry dispute, which, in addition to illustrating the
importance of insurance in the production sector, illuminated a paradoxical
issue in commercial arbitration: if the parties appoint a subject-matter expert
to decide their dispute, does the arbitrator risk being removed for bias if, on
the basis of his experience, he expresses a conclusion about the evidence
before it has been tested at a hearing?
The
case, H1
and H2 v W, D and F [2024] EWHC 382 (Comm), concerned liability under
film production insurance. The insurer contended that the arbitrator, an
industry professional without legal training, had given grounds for “justifiable
doubts as to his impartiality” and sought an order to remove him under section 24
of the English Arbitration Act 1996. Mr.
Justice Calver granted the order.
The
Dispute
The
claimants were producing a television series in Sweden and had obtained
insurance to protect them in case a specified actor suffered an injury that
delayed production. The actor duly
incurred a serious injury during a stunt and the producers claimed under the
policy.
The
insurance policy incorporated an arbitration agreement, under which any dispute
was to be resolved by “an experienced practitioner in film or television
programme production”. The parties being
unable to agree on an arbitrator, the British Film Institute was asked to do
so. The BFI selected one “W”, an
experienced industry professional and not a lawyer.
In
subsequent terms of reference, the parties agreed to waive “any objection to
the appointment of the Arbitrator on the grounds of potential conflict of
interest and/or lack of independence or impartiality in respect of any matters
known to them at the date of the agreement.”
The
insurer pleaded, in essence, that they had excluded liability for any
“hazardous activity” and that it was also a condition of the policy that the producers,
their agents and their employees should use all reasonable care to avoid
accidents. The producers contended that
they had relied on an independent stunt coordinator who had approved the stunt
and that any hazard arose from unauthorized changes to the stunt made during
shooting by third parties, for which the producers could not be held
responsible. It was said that there was “a
central issue in the arbitration” as to industry practice in Sweden: was the
stunt coordinator responsible for safety on the set or was it the
responsibility of the producers?
Both sides proposed to call
expert witnesses on this issue.
The evidence of bias
“I
know all three [of the insured’s experts] very well, … what [the witness]
said is what I will believe.. I absolutely believe what he says... if that’s
what he said I would accept that… I know the professionals. I can say now what
I think”.
At a procedural hearing, the
arbitrator said that he knew the claimant’s experts, that one in particular was
“one of the top Norwegian producers” and that he would accept what he
said about the issue of on-set responsibility in Sweden, even though it
differed from W’s own views as to industry practice. He did not know the insurer’s witnesses, arguably
depreciating their authority. He
indicated that he did not think the experts needed cross-examination. In response, the insurer’s counsel submitted
that W should listen the evidence before reaching a conclusion and W said that
he would, albeit he had formed a view.
The
judge held that these comments gave rise to justifiable doubt as to W’s
impartiality, on the basis that he appeared to have prejudged the allegedly central
issue. He revoked W’s appointment.
According
to the judge, “the parties might expect the arbitrator to use his special
knowledge of the film industry to understand the evidence that is given at the
arbitration and any usages of the trade. But they would not expect him to use
his special knowledge to pre-determine that he would prefer the evidence of an
industry insider whom he knew (both personally and by reputation) over one whom
he did not know” [para. 83]. The judge
treated the arbitrator’s strong view about the witnesses as evidence of bias.
But
what is “bias”?
According
to England’s highest court, to be affected by bias is to be “motivated by a
desire unfairly to favour one side or to disfavour the other.” (R v Gough (Robert) [1993]
UKHL 1, at 4, per Lord Goff.)
Lower courts have said, more vaguely: “Bias can come in many forms. It
may consist of irrational prejudice or it may arise from particular
circumstances which, for logical reasons, predispose a judge towards a
particular view of the evidence or issues before him” (Director General
of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain [2000] EWCA
Civ 350, at para. 37). However, what
unites all instances of bias is the influence on the tribunal of a collateral
factor irrelevant to the proper disposal of the proceedings.
If the
parties select a subject-matter expert as arbitrator, let alone where they expressly
waive any objection of partiality based on his existing knowledge, they accept
that this knowledge can be put to use by him.
The authorities are clear that an arbitrator, at least if an industry
professional rather than a lawyer, is entitled to use his personal knowledge
(for England, see: Mediterranean and Eastern Export Co Ltd v Fortress
Fabrics (Manchester) Ltd [1948] 2 All E.R. 186; for the US: Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 212 P.2d 233
(1949)).
When an adjudicator expresses a
preference about the evidence, that is not in itself any indication of a lack
of impartiality with regard to a party. “The mere fact that the case of one party is
regarded with disfavour is manifestly not enough to raise a danger of bias. It
is necessary to concentrate on the assertion that there is a danger that this
regarding with disfavour was the result of some unfairness” (Porter v Magill [2000]
2 W.L.R. 1420 (C.A.), at 1457). W clearly
wanted to get to the truth of the matter, having asked the parties to make 12
individuals available to answer questions. However, the parties provided witness
statements for only two. He actually
disagreed with the expert witness as to industry practice, but was willing to
accept his evidence.
The
problem in this case was one of due process, not bias. The limitation on the arbitrator is not that
he may not use his existing knowledge, but that he must ensure that it is
deployed with procedural fairness. In
particular, he must enable the parties to challenge his personal view in case
it is not already being contended for by one of the parties (Fox v. Wellfair Ltd [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 515). “It
has to be emphasized, however, that the duty to act fairly is quite distinct
from the autonomous power of the arbitrators to make findings of fact.” (Bulfracht
(Cyprus) Ltd. v Boneset Shipping Company Ltd. "MV Pamphilos"
[2002] EWHC 2292, at page 10, per Colman J.)
What
happened here? The arbitrator shocked
the insurer’s counsel by indicating that he would accept the evidence of the
producers’ witness irrespective of any cross-examination or submissions. This was because he preferred that witness as
a witness. This was evidence of W’s
incompetence, as a layman, in the conduct of an arbitration, not of bias in
favour of the producers. It was
precisely his function to form a view about the persuasiveness of the parties’
witnesses. There was no reason to
suppose he would have said anything different about him if the “top Norwegian
producer” had been called by the insurer, rather than the producers.
Had W
not accepted the admonishment of the insurer’s counsel that he should allow the
process to unroll in the normal way and in fact disallowed or ignored
cross-examination, he could have been accused of failing “properly to conduct
the proceedings”, a distinct ground of challenge under section 24(1)(d) of the
1996 Act. However, it remained to be
seen whether, educated by the lawyers appearing before him, he did in fact take
account of cross-examination and the advocates’ arguments when the hearing took
place. W’s expressed preference for the
producers’ expert was certainly potential misconduct, but it was a category
error to treat it as evidence of bias.
Substantial
injustice
Did it
matter? Arguably, yes: to remove an arbitrator for improper conduct of the proceedings
under section 24(1)(d), the applicant has to show that “that substantial
injustice has been or will be caused to the applicant”. This depends on what would have happened at
the end of the arbitration:
“The test for substantial
injustice focuses on the issue of whether the arbitrator has come by
inappropriate means to one conclusion whereas had appropriate means been
adopted, he might realistically have reached a conclusion favourable to the
applicant. It does not require the court to try the issue so as to determine,
based on the outcome, whether substantial injustice had been caused” (London
Underground v Citylink [2007] EWHC 1749 (TCC) at para. 47, per
Ramsay J. (in the context of a challenge to an award under section 68).
One
possibility is that W would have ignored cross-examination and submissions and
kept to his fixed opinion. If so, that would
have been a failure to conduct the proceedings properly which would probably
have affected the outcome. W would still
have been removed. However, taught by
the advocates as to how an arbitration is supposed to proceed, he might have
listened in good faith to the evidence and applied an open mind. We shall never know.
This would have played out differently in the United States. Although institutional rules, such as rule
R19(c) of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, may empower an arbitral institution to remove an arbitrator for
bias, the courts will not interfere during the course of the arbitration to
remove an arbitrator for lack of impartiality.
The parties have to wait for the award and then apply to vacate it on grounds of “evident partiality" (Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)).
This “narrow standard of review
acts as a bulwark against legal ingenuity. Lawyers can easily find one thing or
another in almost any proceeding to which they wish to take exception. There are
benefits to such legal creativity in many contexts but not in the one before us. Allowing procedural challenges
to every award would force parties into court to argue their dispute a second
time, incurring the litigation costs and delays they intended to avoid by
agreeing to arbitration in the first place.” (UBS
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padussis, 842 F.3d 336, 339 (4th Cir. 2016), per
Wilkinson J).
England is less concerned, it seems, about delay created by legal
ingenuity.
Conclusion
Lay
arbitrators are a valuable option for parties litigating in a specialised
industry; and it is easier to teach a layman about the basic rules of
arbitration than to turn a lawyer into an industry expert. Evidence of a lack of impartiality removes
the arbitrator whether there is a substantial risk of injustice or not, so it
is important to be clear about the difference between holding a relevant view
about the evidence and holding an irrelevant view affecting a party.
Finally,
one wonders what W thinks about this. Under
section 23(5) of the 1996 Act, the arbitrator is entitled to be heard on the
application to remove him, but, understandably, W does not seem to have taken
the opportunity. Although the judge
decided to anonymise the judgment, everyone in the case must have known who the
“biased” arbitrator was and so too, no doubt, people connected with the
production. As a senior member of the industry,
W accepted an invitation by the national film agency to use his experience in
the resolution of a dispute, albeit for a fee.
Will he ever accept, or recommend a professional colleague to accept, a
similar invitation?
It
could surely have been avoided. Someone –
perhaps the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators – could produce a short leaflet
explaining to lay arbitrators how the process is supposed to unroll. The basic principles of arbitration are hardly complex.
However,
full marks to the BFI for supporting arbitration in the film industry. It is to be hoped that this experience does
not put them off a sequel.